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Introduction
The analysis of the cyclicality of labour market dynamics has been a very active field of research for the last two decades. 1 Interest in this issue has been further increased by the debate about the relative importance of the ins and outs of unemployment in this context (cf. Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant, 1986, and Shimer, 2007) . While a consensus seems to emerge that both inflows into and outflows from unemployment have some role to play (cf. Elsby, Michaels, and Solon, 2009, and Fujita and Ramey, 2009 ), important questions remain unanswered. One crucial question, raised by Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) , is "why job-loss-induced inflows to unemployment increase at the beginning of a recession and why outflows do not increase enough to keep unemployment duration from rising."
An obvious suspect in this context is the interaction of heterogeneous agents on both sides of the labour market over the business cycle. However, as Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008) point out, this process is up to now little understood. They argue that, on the US labour market, specific phases of the business cycle see different types of firms hiring different types of workers, which leads to specific labour market transitions and wage dynamics. In particular, in the early phase of an economic expansion, small firms hire mainly from the ranks of the unemployed, a process which results in relatively low wages. In later phases of an economic expansion, hirings from larger firms predominate. With the pool of unemployed workers having shrunk considerably, this entails more direct job-to-job transitions from small to large firms, and higher wages. The interaction of heterogeneous firms and workers thus has important implications for both labour market transitions and the evolution of the wage structure.
Our analysis aims at testing whether this story holds when using both a very rich, linked employer-employee data set, and a data set spanning three decades of workers' employment history. Both data sets are based on administrative micro data providing information on dependent-status, social security employment for West Germany. The former data set additionally contains information from a large firm survey. Together, these two data sets make it possible to analyze the role of heterogeneity on both sides of the West German labour market over the business cycle. We are thus able to provide a complete set of stylized facts 1 The next section provides a brief overview of the literature. 4 on this topic, and to conduct a rigorous econometric analysis controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneities on both sides of the labour market.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section contains an overview of the literature on the cyclicality of labour market dynamics. The third section describes the data sets used in our analysis. The fourth section summarizes the stylized facts of West German labour market dynamics, paying particular attention to the heterogeneities involved. Section 5 offers an econometric analysis of the cyclicality of these dynamics. The last section summarizes our main findings and concludes the discussion.
Labour Market Dynamics and Heterogeneity in the Literature
The empirical analysis of worker turnover and job turnover has a long tradition, with the U.S. labour market having received particular attention. 2 Recently, the relative importance of hirings and separations for the cyclicality of labour market dynamics has taken centre stage, as summarized by Yashiv (2008) . Empirical evidence for Germany remains relatively scarce. Schmidt (2000) uses a representative German household survey, the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), in order to analyse the dynamics of German labour market flows.
His analysis stresses the heterogeneous experience of different demographic groups, especially with respect to their sensitivity to cyclical factors. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) use the IAB employment subsample (IABS) for the time period 1975 to 2001, and calculate labour market transitions. However, they only consider year-on-year changes, which means that a lot of the actual dynamics are not recorded in their study. Employing the same data set, Bachmann (2005) shows that hirings play an important role for labour market dynamics.
One important weakness of the aforementioned studies is that they only control for worker heterogeneity. This implies that they completely neglect the heterogeneity on the firm side, as well as match-specific characteristics. As Hamermesh (2007) points out, this can lead to severe misspecification problems if worker and firm characteristics interact in a systematic way.
2 Blanchard and Diamond (1989) were among the first to provide direct evidence on gross worker flows in the U.S.. For analyses of worker flows and job flows in European countries see Burda and Wyplosz (1994) , and Contini and Rivelli (1997) .
Those problems can be avoided using linked employer-employee data sets. The early literature in this context, summarized by focussed on the determinants of worker flows between different labour market states by accounting for various individual and firm characteristics, which were shown to play an important role. Another finding of this literature is that almost all firms are simultaneously hiring and experiencing separations:
expanding firms continue to lose workers, while contracting firms continue to hire workers, which implies that churning is an omnipresent feature of the labour market. More recently, direct job-to-job transition have been analysed in more detail. Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2008) present descriptive evidence on the importance of worker and firm characteristics for direct job-to-job transitions using linked employer-employee data for the United States. They find that the pace of these transitions is highly procylical, and varies systematically across worker, job and employer characteristics. Frederiksen and WestergaardNielsen (2007) analyse the effects of individual and workplace characteristics, as well as of the business cycle, on individual job separations and the associated destination states in the Danish private sector. They find that there is large heterogeneity both within and between destination states. In examining the relationship between job flows and worker flows, Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2001) allow for firm fixed effects in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity that exists on the employer side. Finally, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009) provide descriptive evidence for the U.S., Denmark, France, and Brazil, that large employers are more cyclically sensitive than small employers.
When analyzing the evolution of hirings over the business cycle, it is important to note that firms generally seem to have a preference for hiring workers who are currently employed, rather than hiring out of unemployment. For example, Eriksson and Lagerström (2006) show that, on the Swedish labour market, unemployed job applicants face a lower probability to get contacted by a firm than otherwise identical employed applicants. They argue that this is due to the fact that firms view employment status as an important signal for productivity. Nagypál (2006) provides another theoretical argument for why firms might prefer hiring employed, rather than unemployed, workers. Workers arriving from unemployment are less likely to end up in a job they are happy with than employed job searchers. Therefore, the former workers are more likely to engage in job-shopping and to leave an employment re-6 lationship for a more appealing job. Given that hiring workers involves fixed costs, firms can economize on these costs by hiring employed workers. It therefore seems important to analyze hirings from employment and hirings from unemployment separately.
There is thus a number of studies analysing labour market dynamics and the role played by either individual or firm heterogeneity. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature on the determination of labour market mobility which investigates econometrically the importance of the observed as well as the unobserved heterogeneity that is simultaneously present on both sides of the labour market. In contrast to this, the research on wage determination is further developed as it includes individual as well as firm fixed effects in the estimation equations. In one of the first studies of earnings based upon linked employeremployee data, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) analyze the annual compensation for French workers by holding the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of workers and firms constant. Abowd, Kramarz, and Roux (2006) continue this line of research analzying both worker and wage mobility. They take into account heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market. However, they do not take into account workers' transitions from unemployment to employment. In this paper, we adopt one of the fixed effects approaches proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for wage regressions, to the analysis of labour market transitions. In particular, we estimate a non-linear model with establishment and individual fixed effects using German linked employer-employee data. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature by controlling for the observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market when examining labor mobility out of employment and unemployment.
Data and Concepts

The data
The following analysis uses two complementary data sets provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the IAB Employment Sample (IABS) and the LIAB, a linked employer-employee data set. The basis of both data sets is the Employment Statistics Register, an administrative panel data set of the employment history of all individuals in Germany who worked in an employment covered by social security between 1975 . 3 For 1995 this data source contains the employee history of nearly 79.4% of all employed persons in Western Germany, and 86.2% of all employed persons in Eastern Germany. The basis of the employee history is the integrated notification procedure for health insurance, the statutory pension scheme, and unemployment insurance. At the beginning and at the end of any employment spell, employers have to notify the social security agencies. This information is exact to the day. For spells spanning more than one calendar year, an annual report for each employee registered within the social insurance system is compulsory, and provides an update on, for example, the qualification and the current occupation of the employee. Further worker characteristics included are the year of birth, sex, marital status, and nationality. 4
The first data set we use, the IAB Employment Sample (IABS), is a 2% representative sample of the Employment Statistics Register for the time period 1975-2004, supplemented with information on all unemployment spells of the workers covered. Given this relatively long time span, we are able to observe two full business cycles. From this sample, we exclude observations in East Germany, apprentices, trainees, homeworkers, part-time workers, and individuals older than 65. This results in a sample with 1.05 million individual workers.
The second data set used in our analysis, the linked employer-employee data set of the IAB (LIAB), combines the information on workers' employment and unemployment history described above with plant-level information from the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual representative survey of German establishments that employ at least one worker who pays social security contributions. Starting in 1993, the establishments covered by the survey were questioned each year about various issues, such as the number of employees, the composition of the workforce, sales and investments. 5 Using the unique establishment identification number, one can match the information on workers with the establishment panel, and obtain a linked employer-employee data set providing detailed information on individual and establishment characteristics. 6 In a first step of this matching process, establishments who 3 This data base has been used, among others, by Bender and von Wachter (2006) and Dustmann and Meghir (2005) .
4 A detailed description of the Employment Statistics Register and the notification procedure is given by Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) . 5 See Kölling (2000) for a detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel.
6 Information on the LIAB data set is provided by Alda, Bender, and Gartner (2005 
The concepts of worker flows and job flows
Since both data sets used contain daily information on the employment and unemployment history of every individual in the sample, it is possible to calculate worker flows taking into spells play an important role in our analysis, we use the longitudinal version of the LIAB. 7 In the IABS data, the record on unemployment benefit recipients are unreliably measured before 1980.
As we can therefore not use the worker flows to and from unemployment for the time period 1975-1979, we start our analysis in 1980.
account every change of labour market state that occurs within a given time period. We are thus able to compute the flows between employment, unemployment and nonparticipation, as well as direct job-to-job transitions (EE flows) using the establishment identification number, which implies that our notion of a job is establishment-based. In addition to EE flows, our analysis focuses on the flows from employment to unemployment and to nonparticipation (EU and EN, respectively), and from unemployment and from nonparticipation to employment (UE and NE, respectively). We define as separation flows all flows emanating from employment, S t = EE t + EU t + EN t , and as accession flows all flows going to em- Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) , we calculate the corresponding rates of each flow by using the average of current and past employment
Since the LIAB data provide information on all workers employed in the establishments covered by the data set for the time period 1997-2003, we are able to exploit the individual information to calculate annual worker and job flows at the establishment level. We define the stock of employment in establishment e at time t, E et , as the number of employment spells including the reference date June 30th in year t. Following the standard terminology (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999) , in which job flows are defined as the net change in employment at an establishment e, the year-to-year job flow rate is given by
where E et and E et−1 reflect the level of employment in year t and year t − 1, respectively.
The job reallocation rate for any given establishment is the absolute value of JF R et :
which is called job creation rate when it is positive, and job destruction rate when it is negative. Following Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000) we define accession and separation rates at the establishment level as follows:
and ery. This means that we can observe a shift from employment-to-unemployment transitions to job-to-job transitions in the mature phase of the economic expansion.
Using the linked employer-employee data set (LIAB), we also computed the annual rates of job flows, worker flows and churning flows at the establishment level over the time period 1997 to 2003 (see Table A .2). Regarding the time series properties, one noteworthy fact is that the job creation rate seems to be procyclical since it increases during the upturn period 1998-1999 and starts to decrease at the beginning of the recession in 2000. In contrast to this, job destruction is countercyclical, because it exhibits the opposite behaviour over the time period under consideration. As job destruction does not vary to a significantly greater degree than job creation, the job reallocation rate shows an acyclical behaviour. 9
Furthermore, we find evidence for a strongly procyclical behaviour of worker and churning flows. 10 Looking at job creation and job destruction, the table shows that both take place simultaneously in all observed years. We find job destruction rates ranging from 4.1% to 10.6%, while employment expanded over the sample period. Finally, we see the mean job reallocation rate at a value of 17.2%, and the worker reallocation rate at a level almost three times higher. Hence, churning flows make up at least two thirds of total worker flows and therefore are a pervasive phenomenon of the German labour market. This implies that firms hire and fire workers, and that workers leave and enter jobs, mostly for reasons related to specific firm needs and worker abilities. This concerns both observable and unobservable worker and firm/job characteristics. To this issue we now turn.
Two-sided heterogeneity and labour market dynamics
In order to analyse the interaction between worker and firm heterogeneities on both sides of the labour market in more detail, we first present stylized facts about job and worker flows at the establishment level (cf. Table A. 3). It becomes apparent that the job reallocation rate declines with the establishment size, ranging from 19.8% in small establishments to 6.6% in very large establishments. Moreover, job reallocation tends to be larger in younger establishments, which seems to be mostly caused by higher job creation rates, since job destruction rates show only slight variations. The same observations can be made for worker and churning flows, which are also higher in smaller and younger establishments throughout all categories. This is also true for the accession (or hiring) rate, which plays an important role in our analysis. It falls monotonically from 29.4% per year for small establishments to 11.5% for large establishments.
Worker flows also vary strongly across different worker and establishment categories. research (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999, and Burgess, 1996) . Looking at worker categories, one can see that there are substantial age-specific differences in worker flows. The flows decrease with the age of employees, which can be explained by the fact that older workers tend to have accumulated more job-specific human capital, and that they are more likely than younger workers to have ended up in a job which suits their skills. Finally, workers characterized by a lower skill level particularly transit between employment and unemployment as well as employment and non-participation. More highly skilled employees,
11 Industry effects were shown to play some role as well, but are not reported here. can observe strong size-specific variations in the distribution of separation destinations. In particular, for small establishments we find a roughly equal proportion of the separations to lead to a new employment (32.2%) and to unemployment (30.08%). In contrast to this, separations from very large establishments are followed by employment in 39.1% of cases, and only 15.9% are followed by an unemployment spell.
As we are mainly interested in the cyclical features of labour market dynamics, we now look at the time series of these distributions. Figure B .3 shows the hiring flows EE, UE, and NE, computed as the share of hirings, for different establishment size classes. As in Table A In order to emphasize the differential behaviour of the different labour market flows across establishment size classes, we calculate the size-specific worker flows as a share of total worker flows. That is, we calculate the following fraction:
where F gt refers to a particular flow occurring in establishment size class g in year t, and already increase their share in hirings during periods of recessions. In contrast to this, the hiring activity of large firms, relative to smaller firms, decreases during recessions and mainly takes place in the mature phase of economic expansions. These observations indicate that the smaller the establishments are, the earlier the hirings occur. It might be the case that larger establishments start hiring at a later date because they lay off fewer people during recessions, which implies that their capacity utilization fluctuates to a greater extent than that of smaller establishments. Regarding the timing of separations, we can observe that for smaller establishments, the share in match separations rises during periods of recessions, while it decreases in larger establishments.
Finally, we also analysed the differences in the hiring and separation behaviour between establishments with different job turnover rates. 13 There is some evidence that establishments with a low job turnover reduce their hiring activity during the recession and raise it in the mature phase of the expansion, establishments characterized by a high turnover hire most notably during the recession and the early phase of the expansion. This is consistent with the fact that small firms are characterised by high turnover. While we can observe similar patterns for the cyclical timing of separations, the latter time series is much more noisy, which makes it difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions in this case.
Job-to-job transitions and wages
We have seen that large firms primarily hire workers out of an existing employment relationship. One potential reason for this is that large firms compete more successfully for employed job seekers than small firms because they are able to offer higher wages, and choose to do so. In order to investigate this fact, we analyze the wage effect of job-to-job transitions. For that purpose, we first calculate for each year in the time period 1975-2004 the fraction of EE flows leading to a higher wage, which is defined as EE flows leading to a higher wage divided by total EE flows. 14 Since this time series contains a strong trend, again a HodrickPrescott filter (HP filter) is used. The HP-filtered deviations from the trend are displayed in 13 Results are obtainable from the authors upon request. 14 Due to the upper contribution limit of the social security system in Germany, the wages reported in the data set are top coded. In order to address this top-coding problem we leave unconsidered the wages close to the contribution ceiling. There is some evidence that the share of job-to-job transitions yielding a higher wage decreases during times of recession and rises until the mature phase of the economic expansion. This observed procyclical pattern can be put down to the fact that in periods of economic recovery employers want to attract employed job seekers, resulting in an increase in the availability of better paid jobs (see Pissarides, 1994) . During economic downturns, however, better jobs and higher wages are hard to find. However, we also found the magnitude and the cyclical behavior of this fraction to be very similar for job-to-job transitions to larger establishments and job-to-job transitions to smaller establishments. Furthermore, the series are relatively noisy and seem to be mostly driven by idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the business cycle. This could be due to the effects of the institutional settings of the German labour market institutions, such as trade unions, making wages relatively unresponsive to economic conditions, which results in wages reacting only weakly to differences between firms (such as firm size) or to changes in aggregate economic factors, the business cycle. This, however, is a matter of further investigation.
Econometric Analysis
Econometric specification
The descriptive analysis indicated that two-sided heterogeneity plays an important role for the cyclicality of labour market dynamics. We now want to analyse this issue econometrically, taking into account observable individual characteristics, observable establishment characteristics, and unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market.
We start by investigating the determinants of worker flows. The aim is to find out how the heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market affects the probability of person i in establishment e of experiencing a certain transition at time t, y iet . For that purpose, we use two different versions of a fixed effects logit model: 15
where i = {1, ..., N } denotes the number of persons in the data set, e = {1, ..., E} the number of establishments, and t = {1, ..., T } the number of quarters. As dependent variables, we consider separations (y iet = s iet ), transitions from unemployment to employment (y iet = ue iet ), and direct job-to-job-transitions (y iet = ee iet ). In particular, the logit model for separations specifies the probability whether or not an individual leaves the establishment The second version (equation 7) extends the first one by additionally including an establishment fixed effect, allowing us to take into account unobserved heterogeneity both on the firm side and on the worker side of the labour market. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) introduce various estimation methods to deal with firm and worker fixed effects in linear models. Amongst these is a method, referred to as spell fixed effects-approach by Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004) , which gives the opportunity to eliminate all timeinvariant unobservable effects at the level of the employment spell by time-demeaning each unique worker-establishment combination. We now adopt this estimation method for our 16 Large establishments are defined as those employing more than 100 workers. Trying alternative definitions, we find very similar estimation results. 17 Estimates including only one GDP growth lag instead of lags 1-4 yield qualitatively similar results.
non-linear logit model and define the spell-level heterogeneity or spell fixed effect as
such that the two fixed effects logit model (equation 7) is now given by
Since neither δ i nor λ e vary for each spell of an employee within an establishment, the spell fixed effects can be eliminated by subtracting averages at the spell-level, which implies that we are able to control for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 18 As in the first version of the fixed effects logit model (equation (6)), the effect of time-invariant regressors is absorbed by the fixed effect. In both versions we correct the standard errors for clustering at the individual and the spell level, respectively.
Estimation results
We present the results from estimating the fixed effects logit model in the following way. The estimated marginal effects of job separation, displayed in Table A .8, largely confirm the results from the descriptive analysis of the last section. In particular, the coefficients obtained from the individual fixed effects estimation (Column A) indicate that the probability of separation significantly declines with the size of an establishment as well as with the employees' skill level. Furthermore, individuals experience fewer job separations with increasing age and increasing employment duration. For individuals aged 55-65, however, we observe a rise in the separation probability, which can mainly be explained by retirements.
Regarding the cyclical behaviour, these estimation results indicate that initially separations are countercyclical, but from the second lag on show a procyclical pattern. Furthermore, 18 Note that this type of heterogeneity is unobserved by the econometrician, but that it might well, and in fact is likely to, be observed by firms and workers. 19 Note that in the spell fixed effects logit model, only those worker-establishment combinations are considered that show a variation in the dependent variable which leads to a loss of observations compared to the worker fixed effects model. This selection effect has an impact, which however is not very large.
large firms are initially less cyclically sensitive than small firms. However, the effect of GDP lagged by two quarters and more is higher for larger firms. Overall, separations by large firms are more cyclically sensitive, and especially when GDP lags of higher order are considered. Interestingly, the coefficients on the explanatory variables in the estimation with spell fixed effects are an order of magnitude smaller than in the estimation with worker fixed effects. This means that unobserved match characteristics play an important role for these transitions. If these unobserved characteristics are not explicitly taken into account, they are absorbed by observable worker and establishment characteristics. This is due to the fact that these observable characteristics are correlated with the unobserved characteristics. In other words, regressions without spell fixed effects feature biased and inflated coefficients on the observable explanatory variables.
For the two hiring flows, EE-and UE-flows, the coefficients of the individual fixed effects estimation (Column A, A.9 and A.10) show that very similar features emerge with respect to the establishment size, and the age of employees. Moreover, as already seen for separations, we observe that the probability of UE-transitions decreases with the skill level of an individual.
In contrast to this, more highly skilled individuals are more likely to experience job-tojob transitions. The estimated coefficients of the GDP variables indicate that job-to-job transitions are procyclical, with the positive impact increasing with the lag. Looking at the coefficients of the interaction term, we see that for large establishments this effect is initially slightly lower but from the first lag on higher than for small establishments. The coefficients of the GDP variables indicate that the transitions from unemployment to employment display a countercyclical pattern for smaller establishments, and a procyclical pattern for larger establishments. These results confirm our observations in the descriptive analysis: Larger establishments hire an increased number of employed job searchers during the later phase of the expansion, while smaller establishments mainly hire individuals out of unemployment, and start doing so earlier than large establishments.
Looking at the hiring hazards in more detail, one can see that in the case of the hazard of experiencing a direct employer-to-employer transition, taking into account spell fixed effects reduces the coefficients on the explanatory variables significantly. This is not the case for the hazard of transiting from unemployment to employment, where the coefficients of the 20 spell fixed effects estimation are very similar to that of the worker fixed effects estimation. 20
This implies that unobserved characteristics play a much more important role for job-to-job transitions. There are several explanations for this. First, employed job searchers are better informed with respect to both their own abilities and potential jobs than their unemployed counterparts. Therefore, they are less dependent upon easily observable characteristics, and unobserved match and firm characteristics become more important. Second, employed job searchers, being employed and earning a wage, are likely to be more choosey with respect to future jobs than unemployed job searchers. Therefore, they will turn down job offers which are unlikely to lead to a good match, and where unobserved firm characteristics seem unfavourable. Unemployed job searchers, on the other hand, have a much lower reservation threshold. They will therefore accept jobs with unfavourable unobserved characteristics more often. Third, the labour market history of employed workers may provide more useful signals to firms than that of unemployed workers. Firms may therefore be able to find workers which suit their needs more easily among the employed than among the unemployed, i.e. sorting of workers by firms is more efficient in the case of employed workers.
Conclusion
Using two data sets on individual workers' labour market histories derived from German administrative data which allow us to identify heterogeneities on both sides of the labour market, we investigate the cyclicality of worker and job flows. Taking into account both observed and unobserved characteristics, our analysis stresses the importance of the interaction between heterogeneous workers and establishments in this context. We find that small establishments hire more workers from unemployment than their larger counterparts. Conversely, large establishments hire much more workers out of an existing employment relationship. We argue that this is in all likelihood due to the fact that large firms compete more successfully for employed job seekers than small firms.
As for the importance of heterogeneous firms and workers for the cyclicality of labour market dynamics, we find that small firms hire mainly at the beginning of an economic expansion. Later on in the expansion, hirings more frequently result from direct job-to-20 Note that for both transitions, the spell fixed effects are defined with respect to the destination state.
job transitions, with employed workers moving to larger firms. With respect to hirings out of employment, we find large employers to be more cyclically sensitive, which is in line with the descriptive evidence presented by Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009) . Hirings from unemployment are found to be nearly acyclical for large firms, and countercyclical for small firms. This reflects the fact that small firms rely on unfavourable business cycle conditions to recruit unemployed workers that suit their needs; such workers are more numerous in the pool of the unemployed during recessions. Looking at separations, the cyclical sensitivity is initially lower for large employers. We find large employers to be cyclically more sensitive only with respect to GDP growth lagged by two quarters and more. We put the delayed response to cyclical conditions down to the fact that large firms are more likely to hang on to workers who have become relatively unproductive because of unfavourable business cycle conditions than small firms. In other words, large firms experience stronger reductions in capacity utilization than small firms at the beginning of recessions. Furthermore, we do not find workers moving to larger firms to experience significantly larger wage gains than workers moving to smaller establishments. This could be explained by the fact that institutions such as trade unions may make wages relatively unresponsive to economic conditions, which results in wages reacting only weakly to differences between firms. Nevertheless, employees still seem to prefer large employers for several reasons, e.g. because they provide better career opportunities.
The use of spell fixed effects to take into account the unobserved heterogeneities on the two sides of the labour market significantly reduces the coefficients on the explanatory variables.
This shows that unobserved characteristics play an important role for these transitions, and that regressions without two-sided fixed effects feature artificially inflated, and potentially biased, coefficients on the observable explanatory variables. Finally, our regression results
show that unobserved characteristics play a more important role for employed job seekers than for the unemployed. This is arguably a consequence of the informational advantage of employed workers relative to the unemployed, as well as of more efficient sorting of employed workers by firms.
Our results thus provide a tentative answer to the question asked in the introduction:
Inflows to unemployment increase during a recession mainly because employer-employee 22 matches in large firms are separated (although this effect comes with a certain delay). Furthermore, while small firms increase their hirings already before the beginning of an economic upswing, large firms strongly reduce their hiring activity during recessions, and only start hiring much later. As a consequence, unemployment outflows do not increase enough to keep unemployment duration from rising during a recession. .0022 *** (.000)
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